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Abstract 
The combination of evidence in Dempster-Shafer theory is compared with the 
combination of evidence in probabilistic logic. Sufficient conditions are stated for 
these two methods to agree. It is then shown that these conditions are minimal 
in the sense that disagreement can occur when any one of them is removed. An 
example is given in which the traditional assumption of conditional independence 
of evidence on hypotheses holds and a uniform prior is assumed, but probabilistic 
logic and Dempster's rule give radically different results for the combination of two 
evidence events. 
1 Introduction 
Researchers on uncertain reasoning within the AI community have recently shown inter­
est in probabilistic reasoning using sets of standard probability assignments. For exam­
ple, Nilsson in [6] and Grosof in [3] have considered methods for reasoning with sets of 
probability assignments generated by probabilistic equality and inequality constraints1. 
Following Nilsson, I use the expression "Probabilistic Logic" to denote the collection of 
such methods. The aim of these methods is to compute a set of possible probabilities for 
a given statement from the specified set of probability assignments. If the set of proba­
bility assignments is generated by probabilistic equality and inequality constraints, the 
possible probabilities for a given statement form an interval. Since Dempster-Shafer also 
associates an interval with each statement A, namely the interval bounded by Bel(A) 
and Pls(A), the question arises as to the connection between Dempster-Shafer belief 
functions and sets of probability assignments defined by equality and inequality con­
straints. Grosof [3] has shown that the latter is a generalization of the former: every 
Dempster-Shafer belief function is representable by a set of probability assignments aris­
ing from equality and inequality constraints, but not vice-versa. A related issue concerns 
the connection between Dempster's rule of combination and the combination of evidence 
statements in probabilistic logic. Grosof [2] states some results concerning conditions 
under which these two methods of combining evidence yield the same result. The aim 
of this paper is to generalize Grosof's results and to investigate how divergent the two 
1 I.J. Good has been an advocate of probabilistic reasoning using inequality statements since about 
1938. See [1, p.25 and pp.75-76) 
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methods can become when the conditions for agreement are not satisfied. Familiarity 
with the basics of Dempster-Shafer theory is assumed. 
2 Conditions for Agreement 
Recall that where m1 and m2 are two mass functions, with focal elements A1, ••• , Ak 
and B11 ••• , B1, respectively, their combination m1 E9 m2, called their orthogonal sum, is 
defined by: 
EA,nB;=A mt(A;)m2(B;) 
1- EA,nB;=0 m1(A;)m2(B;) 
EA,nB;=A mt(Ai)m2(B;) 
EA,nB;;t0 mt(Ai)m2(B;) 
And where m is a mass function, the belief function Bel determined by m is given by: 
Bel(A) = :L m(B) 
B�A 
When working within probabilistic logic, I follow Grosof in making explicit the evidence 
on which a mass function depends. Hence for each mass function m;, the statement 
m;(A) = p within Dempster-Shafer has as counterpart in probabilistic logic the state­
ment P(AlE;) = p, where P is a standard probability function and Ei is a statement 
representing the evidence on which m; is based. 
The following is the most general theorem I know of that states conditions under 
which application of Dempster's rule agrees with combination of evidence in probabilistic 
logic: 
Theorem 1 Let m11 m2 be mass functions over frame E> each with focal elements 
St, ... ,skI where the S; form a partition ofE> (i.e., s in S; = 0 for i ':/; j and sl u ... u sk = 
E> }; E1 and E2 propositions not defined in E>; e = {EtAE2, E1 A •E2, •E11\ •E2}; and 
r a set of probability assignments p over E) X e satisfying 
(i} P(Si} = 1/k, i = t, ... ,k. {By abuse of notation, I identify X � e with 
Xx£� E>x£. 
(ii} P(E1 A EzlSi} = P{EtlSi}P{E2lSi ), i = t, ... ,k. 
{iii} P(SilEt} = m1(S;) and P(SilE2) = m2(Si), i = t, ... ,k. 
(iv) P(E11\ Ez} > 0. 
Then, where Belt,2 is the belief function over e determined by ms = ml EB m2, for all 
A� E>, i E {1, ... , k}, andRE r: 
(1) 
and 
Bel1, 2(A) = min{Q(AlE1 A E2): Q E r} (2) 
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(Grosof [2] states the first part of theorem 1 for a two-membered partition; both parts 
of the theorem can also be derived from results in Yen (7]2 .) 
Proof. First we prove equation (1): For each Si and PEr, we have 
P(E11\ EziSj)P(Sj) 
_ 
P(E1ISi)P(EziSi) 
k - k Li=l P(E11\ EziSi)P(Si) Li=l P(E11\ EziSi) 
[P(E1)P(Sj lEI)/ P(Sj )][P(Ez)P(Sj IEz)/ P(Sj)] 
L:=1[P(E1)P(SiiE1)/ P(Si)][P(Ez)P(SiiEz)/ P(Si)] 
P(Sj IEI)P(Sj IEz) m1 (Sj )mz(Sj) 
2:: =1 P(S.;iE1)P(SiiEz) - L�=l ml(Si)mz(Si) 
m3(Sj) = Beh,z(Sj ). 
To prove equation (2) we construct a P E r such that P(AIE11\Ez) =min{ Q(AIE11\Ez : 
Q E r} and P(AIE1 1\ Ez) = Bel1,2(A). To do so we must distinguish between X � 0 
and X X e � e X e. Let A � e. We wish to construct a probability function p over 
e X e such that P(A X eiEl/\ E2) = min{Q(A X eiEl/\ E2) : Q E r}. The desired 
probability function P will be determined if P( (} 1\ e) is defined for each 8 E 0, e E e. 
This will be accomplished if for each si, p is defined for every element of S; X e. Pick 
any R from r (if r is empty, the theorem is vacuously true). For each S.;, define P over 
the elements of Si X e as follows: if Si � A, set P( 8 1\e) = R( 81\ e) for each 8 1\e E Si X e; 
otherwise, choose a Oo E Si - A and set P( 80 1\ e) = R( Si 1\ e) and P ( 8 1\ e) = 0 for all 
e E si' e f. Oo. This fixes p for all singletons in e X e. By the construction of P, we have 
P(Si 1\ e)= R(Si 1\ e) and therefore since R satisfies (i)-(iv), so does P. Hence PEr. It 
is easy to verify that: 
P(A x eiS·AX) = { 1 if si �.A • 0 otherwise 
We now wish to show that P(A x eiE1 1\ Ez) = min{Q(A x eiE1 1\ Ez) : Q E r} = 
Belt,2(A). By probability theory, for any probability assignment Q in r, Q(A x eiE1/\ 
Ez) = 2::=1 Q(SiiE11\ Ez)Q(A x eiSi 1\Et/\ Ez). By equation (1), Q(A x eiE11\Ez) = 
Ef=l m3(Si)Q(A X eiSi 1\ Ell\ Ez). If si s;;; A, then Q(A X £lSi 1\ El 1\ Ez) = 1. Hence 
Q(A X £1El, Ez) will be minimal if Q(A X eiSi 1\ El 1\ Ez) = 0 when si is not a subset 
of A. But P has this property, so 
min{Q(A x eiE1/\ Ez): Q E f} = P(A x eiE1/\ Ez) = 
L P(Si X eiEl 1\ Ez) = L m3(Si) = Beh,z(A). 0 
To avoid misunderstanding, I should emphasize that the above theorem only states 
sufficient, not necessary, conditions for use of Dempster's rule to agree with combination 
of evidence in probabilistic logic. Thus it is quite possible for there to be cases in which 
the two methods of combination agree, but not all, and possibly none, of the above 
2Yen in [7] is not directly concerned with probabilistic logic; however, his theorem 1 can be interpreted 
as applying to a class of probability functions and by adding the equivalent of my assumption (i) to 
Yen's assumptions, it is not hard to show that theorem 1 of the present paper follows. 
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sufficient conditions for agreement are satisfied. However, three points need to be made 
here: first,· as far as I know, no non-trivial necessary conditions for agreement have yet 
been stated (not even condition (ii), the independence condition, is necessary); second, 
if we think that probabilistic logic gives the right answer but wish to use Dempster's rule 
for computational convenience, then in order to be sure that a particular application of 
Dempster's rule gives the right answer, we need sufficient conditions for agreement, since 
the satisfaction of merely necessary conditions for agreement is no guarantee that there 
is agreement. Finally, what is in effect shown below is that the conditions of theorem 
1 form a minimal set of sufficient conditions in the sense that if any one of them is 
removed then the theorem no longer holds. 
3 How Much Disagreement? 
The next question that arises is, How much divergence arises between Dempster-Shaler 
and probabilistic logic if one or more of the conditions of the theorem is not satisfied? 
Obviously condition (iii) on P must be kept and (iv) is necessary for the conditional 
probabilities to be defined. Thus the obvious candidates for scrutiny are conditions (i) 
and (ii). But other, less obvious, assumptions also enter into the theorem: for example, 
it is assumed that the focal elements of m1 and m2 are the same and that they constitute 
a partition of E>. This section shows that lifting any one of these assumptions can result 
in dramatic disagreement between Dempster-Shafer and probabilistic logic. 
Let us begin by examining the effect of lifting the assumption that the members of 
the partition are equally probable. If (i) were abandoned, then the prior over the S, could 
swamp the effect of E1 and Ez. For example, given any fixed values for P(SiiEt) and 
P(SiiE2), providing both these values are strictly between zero and one, P(SilE1 A Ez) 
can take on any value strictly between zero and one depending upon the value of P(Si)· 
For simplicity consider the case of a bipartite partition of E> -i.e. there are only two 
members to the partition, call them H and H. Then if conditions (ii) and (iv) hold for 
P, the formula 
PH E A E _ 
P(HIEt)P(HIEz) 
( I 1 z) - P(HIEt)P(HIEz) + O(H)P(H!Et)P(H!Ez) 
can be proven. The factor O(H) in the second term of the denominator is the odds 
on H, defined to be P(H)j P(H). By making O(H) sufficiently high, the denominator 
can be made large, thus bringing P(HIE1 A E2) close to zero, regardless of the values 
of P(HIE1 and P(HIE2) (providing neither is equal to one). However, if the sum of 
m1(H) and mz(H) is greater than one, m1 EJ3 mz(H) will be greater than either mt(H) 
or mz(H). For example, with m1(H) = mz(H) = P(HIEt) = P(HIEz) = 0.9, but with 
P(H) = 0.999, we get m1 $ m2(H) � 0.99 but P( HIE1 A E2) = 0.075, a rather large 
difference indeed. Similarly, making O(H) small results in P(HIE1 A E2) being close to 
one. 
The above example presents a counter-intuitive consequence of standard probability 
theory: the higher the prior probability of a hypothesis, the lower will be its posterior 
probability on the basis of the conjunction of two evidence statements that are condition­
ally independent under both the hypothesis and its negation. Though counterintuitive, 
this consequence can be made more plausible by considering the ratio P(HIE)/ P(H), of 
25 
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the posterior probability to the prior, and noting that the higher the prior, the smaller 
this ratio and so the less confirmatory the evidence is of the hypothesis. In particular, if 
P (H) is higher than P(HJE), then even if P(HJE) is high, E will be evidence against H 
and so the effect of combining two such evidence statements, when they are conditionally 
independent, is to even further lower the posterior probability of H. 
Dempster's rule also diverges from probabilistic logic when the evidence statements 
are not conditionally independent under the members of the partition. It is well known 
that the combined effect of two non-independent evidence statements is not determined 
by their individual effects on the probability of a hypothesis (except when one of the 
posterior probabilities is zero or one). I will therefore say no more about the consequences 
of lifting condition (ii). 
Of more interest is the question of what happens when the conditions on P are 
maintained, but the conditions for the mass function are changed. Recall that it was 
assumed that both mass functions have the same focal elements and that these focal 
elements form a partition of the frame of discernment. Consider the latter condition first. 
What if the focal elements do not form a partition? In this case, the main difference is 
that under Dempster's rule, intersections of focal elements always obtain some mass in 
the combined mass distributions, but the same intersections do not always have a positive 
probability in the posterior on the basis of the both evidence statements. For example, 
suppose that 0 = {a, b, c} and m1 {a, b} = m2{ a, b} = ml{b, c} = m2{b, c} = 0.5. Then 
m3{b} = 0.5, but it is easy to construct a P satisfying (i)-(iv) such that P( bJE1AE2) = 0 
-e.g., set P(b) = 0 and P(a) = P( c) = P( Ei) = P( E2) = P( aJEi) = P( cJE2) = 0.5. 
I will present one final example in which Dempster's rule diverges from probabilistic 
logic, one that in my opinion shows a serious defect in Dempster's rule. In this example, 
the focal elements for each mass function form a partition but not the same partition. 
Let the frame of discernment e = {X 1, ••• ' Xn} and let the focal elements of ml be {X 1} 
and {x2, ••• , :z:n} and the focal elements of m2 the singleton elements of 0. Assume 
m2( {xi})= 1/n, i = 1, ... , n. Then 
m1( {x1})m2( {re1}) + 2::�=2 m1( {re2, . . . , :vn})m2( {:vi}) 
m1( {x1})1jn 
m1( {x1})l/n + {1 - ml{re1}) 2::�2 1/n 
m1( {:v1}) 
m1( {:v1}) + ( 1- m1( {re1})) 2::�=2 1 
m1( {x1}) 
(3) 
(4) 
(5) 
(6) 
It can be seen that m3( {x1}) goes to zero as n goes to infinity, providing m1( {x1}) < 
1. This is a disconcerting result. To see why, consider a concrete case in which the 
above mass functions might be combined. Suppose there is a lottery with n individuals 
participating and only one winner. Let the frame of discernment be {x1, ••. , ren}, where 
Xi is the event of the ith participant (in some ordering of the participants) winning. 
It is known beforehand what the winning number is. One piece of evidence is that 
Jones holds a ticket whose digits are identical with those of the winning number, except 
possibly for one digit (e.g, you see Jones' ticket except for one digit, which is obscured). 
Another piece of evidence is that the lottery is fair: the participants get th�ir tickets 
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through some random drawing process. In the Dempster-Shafer theory, the first piece 
of evidence, in the absence of the second, would plausibly be represented by a mass 
distribution of the form of m1- e.g. if :z:1 is the event of Jones' winning the lottery, then 
we might set m1( {:z:1}) = 0.1 if we see that Jones' ticket is identical with the winning 
ticket except possibly for one digit and, in the absence of knowledge as to whether or 
not the lottery is fair, Dempster-Shafer would presumably recommend spreading the 
remaining mass over the set { :z:2, ... , :z: .. }, without assigning any mass to smaller subsets. 
And the second piece of evidence, in the absence of the first, would, I should think, be 
represented by m2 since we have positive evidence that each participant has an equal 
chance of winning. 
· 
With n = 112 and m1( :z:1) = 0.1, we have 
which, being the total mass committed to {:z:1}, yields 
But this degree of belief seems much too low: if you believe that Jones' has at least a 
1 in 10 chance of winning the lottery on the basis of seeing all but one digit of Jones' 
ticket, learning that the lottery is fair should not cause you to lower your degree of 
belief in Jones' winning. Worse still, since combination of evidence is commutative in 
Dempster-Shafer, imagine first learning that the lottery is fair, in which case you assign 
a 1 in 112 chance that Jones will win, and then learning that all but possibly one of the 
digits in Jones' ticket match those in the winning number. Surely it would be absurd to 
then lower Jones' chances of winning to 1 in 1000. 
How would probabilistic logic handle the same example? Note that we cannot really 
keep the conditions on the probability assignment p in theorem 1 the same, since they 
refer to the Si, which are stipulated to be focal elements for both m1 and m2• However, 
we can assume that P( F!Et) = m1(F) for each focal element of m1 and similarly for 
m2• Also, condition (i) presents a bit of a problem since for k > 2, (i) cannot apply to 
both sets of focal elements. We assume instead that (i) applies to the singletons of e. 
In short, we assume that P satisfies the following conditions: 
(1) P( {:z:i}) = 1/n,i = 1, ... ,n. 
(2a) P( Et A E21{:z:i}) = P( Etl{:z:i})P( E2j{:z:i} ), i = 1, ... , n. 
(2b) P( Et A E21{:c2, ... , :z: .. }) = P( Etl{:c2, ... , :c,.} )P( E2j{:z:2, .. .  , :z:,.}) 
(3a) P( {:z:t}IEt) = mt( {:z:t}) 
(3b) P( {:z:,}IE2) = 1/n, i = 1, ... , n. 
(4) P( Et A E2) > 0. 
Conditions ( 1)-( 4) entail: 
(7) 
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Hence E2 has no effect on the probability of {a:1} in the presence of E1 (in fact, as 
required by the theorem of Johnson [4, p.199] for the case n > 2, Ez is jrrelevant to any 
a:i)· Hence no matter how large n is, the probability of Jones' winning given both E1 
and E2 will be 0. 1. This seems a much more reasonable result. 
An objection to the above comparison of Dempster-Shafer with probabilistic logic 
was raised by one of the reviewers of this paper. According to this objeCtion, there is 
nothing surprising in the fact that the combination of the evidence about Jones' ticket 
and the evidence about the fairness of the lottery lowers Jones' probability of winning. 
After all, both pieces of evidence state that it is highly unlikely that Jories will win, so 
why shouldn't their combination make it even more unlikely that he will win? 
This objection confuses a hypothesis's being unlikely on the basis of certain evidence 
with its being disconfirmed by that evidence. A piece of evidence disconfirms a given 
hypothesis if the probability of that hypothesis on the basis of that piece of evidence 
is lower than the prior probability of the hypothesis. If two independent pieces of 
information disconfirm a hypothesis, then their conjunction should indeed disconfirm 
the same hypothesis to an even greater degree. However, in the above example, the 
evidence about Jones' ticket does not disconfirm the hypothesis that he will win. To the 
contrary, given the assumed size of the hypothesis space, it significantly increases Jones' 
probability of winning. Furthermore, the example can modified so that the evidence 
about Jones' ticket makes it highly probable that he will win: assume that you see all 
the digits in Jones' ticket and are ninety percent certain that Jones holds the winning 
ticket (you may be slightly unsure about one of the digits in the winning ticket). Then if 
the only modification to the example is that ml({:z:t}) = 0.9, we find that Belt,z({a:l}) 
is 0.075, still much too low a number, while P({a:1}/E1 1\ Ez) = 0.9. 
The source of the discrepancy between Dempster's rule and probabilistic logic in this 
case can be discovered by rewriting the equations for m3({a:1}) and P({a:l}/E1 /\E2) as 
follows: 
m3({a:1}) 
mt({a:l}) (8) 
ml({a:t}) + T1 
n 
T1 L m1( {a:z, ... ,a: .. }) (9) 
i=Z 
P({a:t}/Et 1\ Ez) 
P({:z:t}/El) ( 10) 
P( { Xt}/El) + T2 
n 
Tz L P({a:i}/El) ( 1 1) 
i=Z 
The difference is in the terms T1 and T2• The difference is that m1 ( { a:2, • . .  ,a: .. } is a con­
stant, whereas P( { a:i}/E1), i = 2, ... , n grows, on average, smaller as n increases since the 
term Tz is equal toP( {a:2 .•• , x .. }/E1), which is stipulated to be equal to m2( {xz, ... ,a:,.}), 
a constant. Hence T1 goes to infinity as n goes to infinity, but T2 remains constant. 
4 Conclusion 
I have proven that Dempster's rule of combination agrees with combination of evidence 
in probabilistic logic under certain conditions. I have also shown that these two methods 
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for combining evidence can produce radically different results when these conditions do 
not obtain. Of particular interest is the fact that even when the conditional independence 
assumptions are satisfied, differences can result when the focal elements of the two mass 
functions do not form a partition or form different partitions. 
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